Although there is evidence that negative advertising "works" at least some of the time, it has been suggested that going negative poses a special risk for female candidates because it violates expectations about appropriate behavior that are rooted in the traditional gender stereotypes still held by many voters. In this paper, we employ data from a survey experiment to examine gender differences in the effectiveness of one particular attack made by a challenger against an incumbent of the opposite sex in a hypothetical race for the U.S. House of Representatives. Our interest is not limited to the attack itself, however, but extends to the question of how candidates should respond when they are attacked and whether certain types of responses/rebuttals (including counterattacks) work better for men than they do for women, and vice versa, in terms of mitigating the damage inflicted by an initially successful negative ad. Overall, we find little indication that the effectiveness of either attack or response (denial, counterattack, counterimaging, justification, and accusing one's opponent of mudslinging) varies significantly according to candidate gender. Further, shared partisanship appears to matter more than shared gender in shaping how voters react to the campaign messages of male and female candidates.
generate a backlash and jeopardize their chances for electoral success (Gordon, Shafie, and Crigler 2003, p. 36) , especially if the attack is delivered personally by the candidate and delivered in a shrill or strident manner (Nelson 2009, pp. 58-59) . 4 Nevertheless, a quick scan of televised campaign ads posted on YouTube, as well as some academic research, 5 confirms the willingness of many female candidates to go negative regardless of what their advisors may be telling them. As for whether they lose more than they gain in doing so, the evidence to date is inconclusive. 6 In this paper, we will examine gender differences in the effectiveness of one particular attack made by a challenger against an incumbent of the opposite sex in a hypothetical race for the U.S. House of Representatives. Our interest, however, is not limited to the attack itself 7 but extends to the question of how candidates should respond when they are attacked -and whether certain types of responses (or rebuttals) work better for men than they do for women, and vice versa, in terms of mitigating the damage inflicted by an initially successful negative ad. 8 It is widely believed that Michael Dukakis and John Kerry lost their presidential bids in 1988 and 2004, respectively, not simply because negative ads created or reinforced voter concerns about their values and leadership ability, but also because the candidates failed to address those concerns in a direct and timely manner (Westen 2007) .
This is an assumption that appears to have been shared by, among others, candidate Barack Obama in 2008. Asked about previous Democratic nominees who responded meekly to hard-hitting Republican attacks, Obama replied, "Yeah, I don't do cowering" (Wenner 2008) . When
Obama told Rolling Stone that candidates today must "respond forcefully, quickly and truthfully to attacks" (Wenner 2008) , he spoke what most professional consultants would consider to be a truism (see Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995, p. 15; Trent, Friedenberg, and Denton 2011, p. 160; Craig and Hill 2011, pp. 140-141 ). Yet even if those consultants are correct on the general point, we still know very little about the relative effectiveness of different types of responses, and almost nothing about whether such effectiveness is a function of candidate gender. The research described here represents a modest first step in trying to rectify that situation.
Negative Ads and Candidate Gender
What is the impact of campaign advertising on voter decision making? Candidates, their consultants (especially media specialists), party leaders, and political journalists believe that it is often substantial and occasionally decisive. Academic studies, however, have yielded mixed results regarding the effectiveness of political advertising generally, and of negative ads (or other forms of negative campaigning) in particular. Recent work that uses satellite monitoring of campaign ads to create individual-level measures of (potential) exposure suggests that paid ads may have greater influence on candidate preference than previously thought (Goldstein and Freedman 2000; Franz and Ridout 2007; Huber and Arceneaux 2007) . Even so, many scholars continue to believe that campaign communications, including advertising, are important less for their persuasive effects than because they serve to activate existing predispositions (especially those rooted in partisan attachments), reinforce initial preferences, or mobilize/demobilize segments of the electorate that are more/less supportive of the sponsoring candidate.
The effectiveness of specifically negative ads also is uncertain, as only a minority of academic studies indicate that going on the attack actually "works" as intended (Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 2007) . It seems likely that the inconsistent findings of this literature are due in some degree to the fact that negativity lies in the eye of the beholder; that is, whether a tactic, a candidate, or a campaign is [perceived as] negative depends on whose ox is being gored. This self-serving subjectivity contrasts starkly with the perspective of social scientists who, in gauging the tone of a campaign, strive to take all available information into account and to weigh it impartially (Sigelman and Kugler 2003, p. 144 ; but see Ridout and Franz 2008; Sides, Lipsitz, and Grossman 2010) .
Thus, for example, one should not be surprised to learn that partisans react differently to attacks coming from the other side than they do to accusations made by candidates of their own party (Iyengar, Jackman, and Hahn 2008; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Stevens, Sullivan, Allen, and Alger 2008; Geer 2006; but see Franz and Ridout 2007) .
We suspect that partisanship also has much to do with how voters react to negative ads sponsored by women. As noted earlier, some individuals "may rely heavily on gender stereotypes when evaluating a female candidate who goes on the attack" (Gordon, Shafie, and Crigler 2003, p. 36), withholding their support for women who violate traditional sex role expectations by attacking their opponents during a campaign. This tendency probably varies across voters (e.g., by gender, age, level of information), contexts (e.g., local norms, prevailing "mood," office sought), issues (e.g., "masculine" issues such as taxes or national security vs. "feminine" issues such as education or the environment; see Gordon, Shafie, and Crigler 2003) , or other alleged transgressions (e.g., relating to honesty, character, performance) that form the basis for campaign attacks. But above all else, we anticipate that it will vary with the party affiliation of the candidate. According to a recent survey experiment conducted by Krupnikov and Bauer (2013) , voters are more likely to punish women relative to men (based on gender stereotypes, a mediating variable 9 ) only when they (a) are seen as having instigated the negativity and (b) represent the opposite party. Setting aside the question of instigation, 10 we expect a similar result here:
H1: A well-crafted attack 11 by either a man or a woman will be more effective among voters who share that candidate's party affiliation.
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H2: Among voters who identify with the opposing party (but not necessarily fellow partisans or independents), attacks by female candidates will be less effective than those made by male candidates.
Assuming that an attack inflicts some damage in terms of diminished vote support and lower favorability ratings (and the ad we tested certainly did that), what is the best way for a candidate to respond? One option is simply to stay on message while ignoring the specific charges. Contrary to what many practitioners believed in the early days of negative ads on TV (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991) , this is no longer considered to be a wise strategy. A more promising approach involves denial: Specifically, if the target can credibly argue that the attack is based on false information ("it never happened"), s/he should quickly do so because there is a fairly good chance that the offending campaign will be penalized by voters for its actions (Johnson 2007; JohnsonCartee and Copeland 1991) .
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Communications scholars have identified a number of other possible responses, four of which are considered (along with denials) in our analysis:
• counterattacks, the content of which may have little to do with the original attack;
• mudslinging, a specific type of counterattack that ignores the original charges and criticizes the opponent for waging a negative campaign, especially if s/he has promised not to do so;
• counterimaging, a positive message that flips the attack on its head by "laying out for the voter a counterproposition to the content of the opponent's negative ad," e,g., police
officers praising the record of someone accused of being soft on crime; see JohnsonCartee and Copeland 1991, p. 244 ); 14 and
• justifications, which acknowledge the behavior and accept responsibility, but attempt to downplay its negative consequences.
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Consultants would probably agree with Republican consultant David Hill that in most instances "the best response is to make a counter-charge" (Craig and Hill 2011, p. 141 ; also see Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995, p, 15) , though our research (Craig, Rippere, and Grayson 2013) found that all of these responses except for accusations of mudslinging were more or less equally effective at mitigating the initial damage done by an attack.
Is this as true for women candidates as it is for men? The literature, which focuses far more on attacks than on responses, provides almost no guidance regarding what gender differences we might expect to find. The same logic that has been applied to attacks might also hold true for counterattacks (including accusations of mudslinging); that is, because of the gender stereotypes held by many voters, there may be a disproportionate risk of backlash for female candidates who respond to negative ads in kind. As noted earlier, however, empirical support for this argument on the attack side is mixed at best. Further, according to Krupnikov and Bauer (2013) , opposing partisans often react differently to negativity depending on which candidate is perceived as having cast the first stone. Because the attacker in our simulation is, by definition, the "instigator," there is no reason to anticipate that counterattacks will be less effective for women than for men. More generally, absent any prior studies that might suggest otherwise, we employ the null hypothesis as our benchmark:
H3: No response type will be significantly more (or less) effective for male candidates than for females.
Finally, as with attacks (H1), we expect partisanship to have a strong influence on the effectiveness of any response ad regardless of the candidate's gender:
H4: Any response, whether delivered by a man or a woman, will be more effective among voters who share that candidate's party affiliation.
Study Design
Our research is part of a larger project that is designed to assess the impact of both attacks and responses/rebuttals in a political campaign. To get a better sense of how people think about such matters, we conducted two focus groups with frequent voters in June, 2010; this was an exploratory exercise designed not for the purpose of hypothesis testing, for which focus groups are ill-suited, but rather to get feedback from ordinary citizens that would assist us in creating our campaign ads (see Craig, Grayson, and Rippere 2010). Next, we carried out a controlled, within-subjects experiment with 278 students who were enrolled in introductory political science classes at the University of Florida. In that experiment, gender was held constant (both candidates were male) and participants were exposed to a pair of hypothetical contests for the U.S. House from Florida, one said to be taking place in Orlando and the other in Fort Myers. The reason for having multiple races was that we wanted to test the effectiveness of two separate attacks, and of various responses to each (Craig, Rippere, and Grayson 2012). Only one race and one attack are examined in this paper, which nonetheless extends our earlier analysis in two important respects: the use of a broader, more representative sample of respondents, and consideration of candidate gender.
The sample includes 662 voters who completed an Internet survey that was conducted from June 21-24, 2012. Data were provided by qSample (see www.qSample.com), a market research firm that has recruited over five million individuals to participate in research projects related to video gaming, home building/contracting, home ownership, issues of particular interest to college students and Baby Boomers, as well as politics. Respondents for our survey were drawn from a national panel of registered voters, geographically balanced by region of the country, whose members engage in online polling, ad testing, focus groups, and in-depth interviewing on a range of politically relevant topics. We make no claim that the sample is representative of all registered voters in the United States, though it clearly is a much more diverse group than the students who participated in our controlled experiment.
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The structure of our survey experiment was as follows: Respondents were randomly assigned to one of twenty treatment groups (or orders) and asked to complete a background questionnaire that measured basic demographics, political knowledge, party identification, and a number of other political orientations. They were then told to imagine that it was the fall of 2012, and one of the races on their ballot involved a congressional matchup between an incumbent seeking a third term and an experienced challenger who had served in both local office and the state legislature. After reading short biographies of the candidates, 17 participants were asked to indicate a vote preference ("Based on the information you currently have, which candidate would you vote for if the election were held today?") and to rate each candidate on a 7-point scale ranging from "very unfavorable" (1) to "very favorable" (7). They subsequently read what was described as a direct-mail attack 18 by the challenger and once again registered their vote choice and candidate assessments. Finally, they were given the incumbent's response and answered the vote and candidate questions a third time.
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In crafting the attacks, we opted not to employ policy appeals that would likely be viewed through a partisan/ideological lens by many voters (Iyengar, Jackman, and Hahn 2008; also see Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012) . Our focus was instead on performance-based attacks wherein a challenger alleges that "the incumbent has lost his touch with the people back home, doesn't work hard, doesn't stand on principle and changes his mind to please different people, has used the office for personal gain, will say just about anything to get reelected, and, as the sum of all these charges . . . doesn't deserve to be reelected" (Johnson, 2007, p. 65) . This seems to be an especially good basis for evaluation when the target is an incumbent, as is the case in our experimental manipulations.
One of the two attacks (taking advantage) to which the student sample was exposed had a larger and more consistent impact on participants' attitudes than the other (out of touch), 20 and was therefore selected for replication in the Internet survey; it charged the incumbent with "helping himself to other people's money" in a number of ways, i.e., voting for pay raises, using party money to finance a family vacation, renting office space from his brother at inflated prices, overbilling clients for professional services, and channeling no-bid government contracts to campaign donors.
These allegations, regarding matters that are clearly relevant to the target's performance as an elected representative, were made in language that might not be considered "uncivil" by FridkinKenney (2008) standards but comes very close to that line by using such emotionally charged terms as "corrupt," "immoral," and "deserves to be in jail more than in Congress."
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Each participant read the text for taking advantage plus one of the five responses described earlier (denials, counterattacks, counterimaging, justifications, and accusations of mudslinging); these responses are summarized in Table 1 , with complete wording available via our online appendix. The impact of candidate gender was tested empirically using a within-subjects design with the following parameters:
• 1 (Attack Type: taking advantage) X 5 (Response Type) X 4 (party affiliation + gender combinations) = a total of 20 treatment groups, to which participants were randomly assigned.
Specifically, for each attack-response pair, four different treatment conditions were created: male Republican incumbent attacked by female Democrat, female Republican incumbent attacked by male Democrat, male Democratic incumbent attacked by female Republican, and female Democratic incumbent attacked by male Republican. We should note that our randomization process appears to have been successful. No statistically significant differences (p < .10) were observed among members of the twenty groups with regard to demographics, partisanship, ideological self-placement, or baseline candidate preferences (vote choice, favorability ratings).
In addition, there were no statistically significant differences for these same variables among respondents assigned to the five response ad types. Thus, if differences are found across research groups after respondents' exposure to the attack and response messages, we can be confident that these are driven by exposure to the experimental stimuli. was considerably more potential for movement among the target's co-partisans (and, to a lesser extent, among independents, 56.4 percent of whom initially said they would vote to re-elect).
Changes in candidate favorability were more evenly balanced across the three groups; this is evident not only from the scores reported in Table 2 , but also from a comparison of the relative standing of the candidates before and after the attack (the incumbent/target suffered a net loss of 1.078 points among co-partisans, 1.340 points among those on the other side, and 0.812 points among independents). 25 Even so, these results provide further confirmation that, contrary to H1, shared partisanship does not always shield candidates from the impact of hard-hitting criticism by their opponents. This is not to say that partisanship plays no role in determining how people react to campaign ads; it merely suggests that when voters encounter negative information about a candidate whom they are otherwise inclined to support (especially absent a response from that candidate), shared partisanship may not be enough to prevent a loss of support.
What, then, about shared gender? The bottom two rows of Table 2 show that the attack caused the incumbent/target to lose ground in terms of both vote share and relative favorabilitybut this was equally true (statistically speaking) for those who shared the target's gender and for those who did not. While we offered no formal hypothesis regarding the impact of shared gender, one might suspect that voters will tend to react differently to criticism depending on whether it is directed at in-group (same-sex) or out-group candidates. At least for this sample and this particular campaign attack, no such bias is evident.
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The results in Table 3 more directly address our central research question, i.e., whether voters are either more or less receptive to negative ads, including negative responses, by male and female candidates in mixed-gender races. 27 Following Krupnikov and Bauer (2013) , H2
posits that attacks by women will be less effective than those made by men among the incumbent's fellow partisans -but not necessarily among independents or those identifying with the party of the attacking challenger. Looking at all respondents (row 1), we see that our hypothetical female candidate fared less well than her male opponent in every category: Her attack produced a smaller decline in both incumbent vote share (-14.7 percentage points vs. -21.7
for the male) and incumbent favorability (-1.524 points vs. -1.730), while generating greater backlash in terms of lower favorability scores for herself (-0.568 points vs. -0.453). However, none of these differences are significant at conventional levels of probability (incumbent favorability comes closest at p < .10). Table 3 about here Does the pattern change when we take partisanship into account? Yes, but not much and not across the board. Among the incumbent/target's co-partisans (row 3), where H2 says women should be at a disadvantage, the only significant gender difference is for challenger favorability:
There was a larger backlash against our female attacker (-0.897 points) compared with her male counterpart (-0.373 points, p < .01). Also at odds with H2 is the fact that the women had less success than men in reducing the incumbent's vote share among their own fellow partisans (+2.4
percentage points vs. -10.0 for the male, p < .05). Interestingly, among independents there was less backlash against the female attacker in terms of diminished favorability (-0.253 points vs. -0.730 for the male, p < .01); although this suggests that independents are less likely than partisans to invoke traditional gender stereotypes, we hesitate to draw any such conclusion in light of the null results observed for vote preference and incumbent favorability.
Overall, the findings here provide little support for H2. Whereas an attack by the woman may have been slightly less effective than one by the man, differences between the two were small, inconsistent, and evident at times among both groups of partisans (with independents exhibiting a modest tendency in the other direction). The bottom two rows in Table 3 examine the impact of shared gender and once again, as with partisanship, we find that impact to be limited in magnitude and scope. An attack by the male candidate is significantly more effective than that by the female in two instances: (a) favorability declines more sharply among women voters when a male challenger attacks a female incumbent (-1.864 points) than it does among men voters when a female challenger attacks a male incumbent (-1.349, p < .01; see row 5); and (b) backlash in the form of lower challenger favorability is less pronounced among men voters when a male candidate attacks (-0.379) than it is among women when a female candidate attacks (-0.707, p < .05; see row 6). But shared gender does not appear to matter much in other areas, including the all-important category of vote intention.
Effectiveness of Responses
The modal response to a campaign attack in American politics today is probably a counterattack, often on some matter that is unrelated, or tangentially related, to the initial charge.
As reported elsewhere (Craig, Rippere, and Grayson 2013), however, four of the five active responses examined here -all except accusations of mudslinging -were more or less equally effective at mitigating the damage done by two separate attacks (taking advantage and, among our student participants, out of touch). It is highly unlikely that this result is generalizable across all campaign scenarios; that is, variations in the messenger (some candidates communicate better or have more credibility than others), the message (either content or style), or the circumstances in which the message is delivered could produce a variety of outcomes. Nonetheless, for our respondents and for this particular attack, four of the five responses tested can be said to have "worked" reasonably well. The question to which we turn now is whether this was true for male and female candidates alike.
With little theoretical reason to believe otherwise, we hypothesized (H3) that no response type would be more or less effective for women than for men. A quick glance at the results in Table 4 suggests that some gender differences may exist, most notably:
• denials seemed to work better for men, especially in terms of recovered vote share (+23.1 percentage points from post-attack to post-response vs. +12.9 for women); and
• women fared better (+32.2 percentage points vote share vs. +17.5 for men; +1.220 points incumbent favorability vs. +0.857 for men) when justifying their actions to voters.
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It is tempting to apply a post-hoc intuitive sort of logic to these findings, i.e., to suggest that denial is a more forceful, hence more "masculine" response; and that justification (explanation, education) is viewed by voters as a more "feminine" approach to conflict resolution. A problem with this interpretation is that none of the gender differences shown in Table 4 are statistically significant at even a p < .20 level of confidence. In other words, H3 is clearly confirmed for each of our dependent variables. Not much changes when we consider the net effects of attack and response, that is, where the candidates stood after participants heard from both sides. There are three possible outcomes:
the incumbent/target could have emerged as (a) weaker than before, (b) stronger than before, or (c) in roughly the same position that existed prior to the attack. With regard to vote preference, four of the five responses served to restore the pre-attack status quo -but nothing more, a result that might disappoint some candidates (and consultants) who hope to gain an advantage in any exchange with their opponent. Accusations of mudslinging failed to achieve even that limited objective, as both men and women ended up with less support than when they began (a decline of 12.9 and 11.9 percentage points, respectively, from their baseline numbers; see columns 1 and 4 in Table 5 ). More importantly for our purposes, however, no significant differences are observed between male and female candidates for any of the five responses. Table 5 about here
There are a handful of exceptions to this pattern as it applies to net changes in candidate favorability. Looking at incumbent (columns 2 and 5) and challenger (columns 3 and 6) scores separately, we see that the cumulative effect of attack and response was a negative one for both candidates, i.e., their favorability was lower following the exchange than it was at the baselinesomething that is true for all responses, and for male and female candidates alike. The overall rule of gender equivalence is not universal. First, denials by men had a substantially greater negative net impact (-1.492 points vs. -0.694, p < .001) on challenger favorability than did denials by women; the same was true to a lesser degree for male candidates who stayed positive via counterimaging (-0.815 points vs. -0.425, p < .05). Second, counterattacks worked better for men, but only in terms of limiting the decline of incumbent favorability (-1.113 points vs. -1.721, p < .05). Finally, in line with our earlier (non-significant) finding, justifications were marginally more effective for women in lowering challenger favorability (-1.339 points vs. -0.857, p < .10).
Some of these effects are fairly large, but there simply isn't enough consistency for us to conclude that any response type works better for candidates of one gender than for candidates of the other. An examination of net effects therefore provides further confirmation of H3.
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We conclude our analysis by re-considering the moderating role of partisanship. Our final hypothesis (H4) states that any response, whether delivered by a man or a woman, will be most effective among the incumbent/responder's fellow partisans. Contrary to expectations, the attack worked best (at least for vote preference; see Table 2 ) among the incumbent's co-partisans and independents; 30 upon reflection, this makes sense given that few participants who identified with the attacker's party planned to support the incumbent in the first place. However, absent such a "ceiling effect" or other special circumstances, one might assume that partisans will usually react more positively to any campaign message from candidates on their side of the aisle. In our survey, the incumbent/responder's fellow partisans should therefore exhibit greater movement in his/her direction (and more pronounced backlash against the challenger) after the attack has been answered than is found among either the attacker's co-partisans or independents. Further, if H4 is correct, that movement should occur regardless of candidate gender.
Looking at shifts from t 2 -t 3 (as in Table 4 ), we see that shared partisanship matters but not in every instance and not always in an even-handed manner for all candidates. To make our data presentation somewhat less unwieldy, Table 6 is divided into three parts, one for each dependent variable. Keep in mind that the question here is not whether a particular response type was effective; that was addressed, separately for male and female incumbents, in Table 4 . What we are asking now is whether both women and men fare better, as H4 predicts, among voters who share their party affiliation than among those who do not. The answer is that, for the most part, they do. With regard to vote preference, we see in Table 6a that denials, counterattacks, and justifications produced significant (p < .05) post-response gains among co-partisans for women and men alike -but not, in the majority of cases, among opposing partisans or independents; in contrast, counterimaging and accusations of mudslinging failed to generate significant change in any partisan category. In fact, we are oversimplifying matters just a bit with this summary. A careful review of Table 6a about here
The pattern for incumbent favorability in Table 6b is different, at least with respect to the effects of shared partisanship. First, each of the five responses was associated with higher ratings (p < .05) among fellow partisans for male and female incumbents alike. And second, significant or near-significant gains were also registered for some responses among independents and even opposing partisans (denials, counterimaging, and justifications for both men and women). Such changes are potentially important if, as many scholars believe, candidate evaluations are the most proximal determinants of vote choice (Kelley and Mirer 1974) ; that is, the impact of any campaign exchange could influence the election outcome by shaping perceptions of the candidates, regardless of whether it has an immediate or direct effect on the vote decision itself.
Setting that prospect aside, the results in Table 6b generally support H4: Response messages of all types tended to resonate more fully -though not exclusively -and to an approximately equal degree for men and women (see note 31) among the responding candidate's fellow partisans. Table 6b about here   Table 6c tells a more complex story, with some new variations on the broader theme. For the sample as a whole, four of the five responses (the exception was counterimaging) produced a significant decline in challenger favorability from t 2 -t 3. As it happens, this decline was not always greatest among the incumbent/responder's fellow partisans, nor was its magnitude always statistically equivalent for men and women. Counterattacks, for example, worked about as well (and perhaps a little better, though p > .10 in all instances) among those who identified with the attacker's party and independents as they did among the incumbent's co-partisans -something that was true for both male and female candidates. The most interesting gender anomaly in Table   6c is that charges of mudslinging and denials were more effective (p < .05 and .10, respectively) for women than for men among their co-partisans, while denials worked better for men than for women (p < .05) among independents. Still, one searches in vain for any sort of consistent pattern that clearly contradicts the expectations set forth in H4. On the whole, post-response shifts in challenger favorability appear to be mostly in line with our earlier conclusions regarding the importance of shared partisanship, and the irrelevance of candidate gender, in shaping how voters react when candidates try to regain their footing following an attack. 
Discussion
Although there is evidence that negative advertising "works" at least some of the time, it has been suggested that going negative poses a special risk for female candidates because it violates expectations about appropriate behavior that are rooted in the traditional gender stereotypes still held by many voters. If this is true (and it may or may not be; prior research is inconclusive), then women could be at a similar disadvantage when they answer a negative with a negative, that is, when they respond in kind to an opponent's attack -precisely the strategy that is preferred by many or perhaps even most campaign professionals. Our study has addressed these possibilities using data from an Internet-based survey experiment with a national sample of registered voters. Specifically, we examined gender differences in the effectiveness of (1) a performance-based negative attack made by a challenger against an incumbent of the opposite sex in a hypothetical race for the U.S.
House; and (2) five distinct responses, some of them (counterattack, accusations of mudslinging) more negative in tone than others, to that attack.
In fact, results indicated that party mattered more than candidate gender in shaping voters' reactions to both attack and response -but not always in the exact manner, or to the degree, that we thought it would. Looking first at our sample as a whole, we learned that the impact of taking advantage was the opposite of what was predicted in H1: The incumbent/target lost more support among his/her co-partisans (and independents) than among those who identified with the opposition. This makes sense given that few opposing partisans said they would vote for the incumbent in the first place, i.e., there was very little potential for movement among these individuals, even if their response to the attack was favorable (as it probably was). Yet even with favorability scores, post-attack changes in the candidates' relative standing did not differ significantly between the two groups of identifiers. Similarly, the attack proved to be neither more nor less effective among voters who shared the candidate's gender than it was among those who did not. While social identity theory (e.g., Greene 2004; Huddy and Carey 2009) might lead one to expect that citizens will react differently to negative campaign messages depending on whether they are directed at in-group or out-group candidates, neither shared partisanship nor shared gender had much of an impact in this instance.
Aside from considerations of shared identity, was there any evidence to support the notion that negative ads are less effective for women than for men? Not really: Among all voters, the attack moved fewer votes and had a weaker impact on favorability ratings when it was made by our female candidate than when it was made by her male counterpart -but differences once again fell short of being statistically significant. Taking our cue from Krupnikov and Bauer (2013) , we posited that women would incur a greater penalty for going negative but only among the incumbent/target's fellow partisans (H2). This pattern was evident in one instance but, for the most part, the attack worked about as well for one candidate as it did for the other among voters of all partisan stripes (and both genders).
With little guidance from the literature, we hypothesized that the effectiveness of our five response types would be similar for women and men (H3). While the gender stereotypes argument might lead one to expect that counterattacks and accusations of mudslinging will be less effective for female candidates, that appears not to have been the case here. The mudslinging charge yielded unimpressive results for both male and female incumbents, and we observed only one instance (limiting the overall decline of incumbent favorability from t 1 -t 3 ) in which our counterattacking female fared significantly less well than a male candidate who chose to answer a negative with a negative. There were hints that denials may work better for men, justifications for women -and it is possible to make a case that these results reflect traditional stereotypes as well (the former being a more "masculine" response, the latter a more "feminine" approach to conflict resolution). In general, however, gender differences in our study were too small and too inconsistent to warrant a rejection of H3.
Finally, we hypothesized that any response, whether made by a man or a woman, would be most effective among the incumbent/responder's fellow partisans (H4). Although this was the case in most cases, there are a number of exceptions. Denials, counterattacks, and justifications, for example, boosted the vote share of both male and female incumbents among co-partisans (while generally having a weaker impact on opposing partisans and independents) -but the same was not true for counterimaging and mudslinging, which failed to generate significant change in any partisan category. Our analysis also revealed some anomalies with regard to candidate (especially challenger) favorability. Nevertheless, the overall pattern is consistent with the expectations laid out in H4: Response messages resonated more fully, and to an approximately equal degree for men and women, among the responding candidate's fellow partisans.
The big story here is the dog that did not bark. For this particular attack, and these five responses, most voters (regardless of their own gender) reacted in a similar fashion to both male and female candidates. Most importantly, there is very little evidence to support the argument that women are held to a different standard when they choose to go negative proactively, or when they answer an attack by criticizing their attacker. Our analysis suggests that some types of responses may work better for either men or women with certain groups of voters, and the same thing is almost certainly true for attacks as well, e.g., claiming that one's opponent is unworthy of voter support based on his/her policy positions vs. character vs. performance (in or out of public office)
vs. personal values, and so on. Given the inability of scholars to faithfully re-create a political campaign in the laboratory (Gadarian and Lau 2011), questions such as these can only be answered through an accumulation of research that employs a healthy mix of observational and experimental (lab, field, and survey) designs (see Arceneaux 2010).
Indeed, there are several potentially important campaign elements that we were unable to examine in this study (see Craig, Rippere, and Grayson 2013 for a more complete discussion). One that may have different implications for men and women is the role of repetition. Our participants viewed a single attack followed by a single response, which represents a severely truncated version of the communication flow that occurs over the course of the typical campaign. Judging from the barrage of advertising to which voters are exposed in virtually any high-visibility, high-expenditure contest today, political professionals are strong believers in the value of repetition (see the confirms that belief, while at the same time indicating that too much repetition of a negative ad over too short a period of time can backfire on the sponsor candidate (Fernandes 2013). In addition, there is evidence that repeated exposure to negative ads may create a backlash against the sponsor among women voters (but not necessarily men; see King and McConnell 2003) . We encourage future scholars to determine whether this still (or typically) is the case today, and whether the reactions of men and women voters to message repetition vary with the gender of the candidate doing the attacking. While our study is one bit of good news for those who would like to see a level playing field for all politicians regardless of gender, there remains much work to be done before we can say with confidence that this has been achieved in the area of campaign communication. 
Also see Eagly and Karau (2002). Schneider and Bos (2013) offer a contrary view,
suggesting that the stereotypes for female politicians are different from those for women in general. This is not necessarily helpful, however, because it leads to female candidates "losing" on stereotypical male qualities (such as leadership and competence) without possessing any countervailing advantages on qualities normally associated with women (such as caring and compassion). That is, female politicians are characterized "not by possession of typically female traits but by their deficiency in masculine traits" (p. 15). On the other hand, Hayes (2011) concludes that partisan stereotypes are more powerful than gender stereotypes and likely to remain so in an era of heightened polarization between Republican and Democratic party elites.
4. As Nelson (2009, p. 59 ; also Jamieson 1995) points out, female speech is sometimes devalued by describing it as "shrill" when the same words delivered by a man would not be viewed as anything out of the ordinary.
5. Some studies indicate that men are more likely than women counterparts to engage in negative campaigning (Kahn and Kenney 2004) , but others show that women are more negative (Bystrom and Miller 1999) , at least in mixed-gender races (Nelson 2009 ), or suggest either that (a) all else equal, gender differences are negligible (Lau and Pomper 2004) Jamieson (1992) and Geer (2006) . Denial is probably better for rebutting demonstrably false accusations of personal misconduct (e.g., falsifying one's educational background or military service record, failing to pay taxes, engaging in shady business practices) than for countering charges that are fundamentally political in nature (e.g., being out of touch with voters, doing the bidding of "special interests," flip-flopping on the issues).
14. An excellent example of counterimaging occurred during the 2008 Democratic presidential primary, when Hillary Clinton aired the controversial "it's 3 a.m. and something's happening in the world" ad that emphasized (without mentioning his name) her opponent's lack of experience. The Obama campaign responded with an ad that closely resembled Clinton's but conveyed a very different (and we would argue, generally positive, the implied comparison notwithstanding) message suggesting that the best person to be answering the phone at 3 a.m.
was the one who had taken the "correct" positions on Iraq, al-Qaeda, and nuclear disarmament. 15. Some of these strategies are drawn from the work on "political accounts" by Kathleen
McGraw and colleagues (McGraw, 1990; McGraw, Best, and Timpone, 1995) . Three types of responses not examined here are concessions (acknowledging the behavior, accepting some degree of responsibility, and promising never to do it again; this approach is unlikely to work in most circumstances, but see Jamieson 1992, p. 118 for an exception); excuses (acknowledging the behavior in question but denying responsibility; these are rarely used in campaigns, and the political accounts literature suggests that they would probably not be successful if they were; see McGraw 1990); and inoculation (an effort to limit potential damage by anticipating and responding to an attack before it is initiated; see Pfau and Kenski, 1990 ; this strategy simply was not practical to test with our research design). In addition, the silence option (ignoring the charges, staying on message)
can only be tested indirectly, i.e., by measuring the impact of an attack prior to the introduction of an active response. Given that the boost provided by any campaign ad is likely to be temporary (Gerber, Gimpel, Green, and Shaw, 2011; Hill, Lo, Vavreck, and Zaller, 2007) , a more realistic approach would be to examine this impact after a longer time interval than the one used here (see, for example, Weaver Lariscy and Tinkham, 1999 conservatives, and 14.5% other (including 11.8% who said they "haven't thought much about it"); 41.1% self-identified Democrats, 13.6% "pure" independents, 34.2% Republicans, and 11.1% other.
17. Each candidate's party affiliation and status as either challenger or incumbent was specified, but otherwise the biosketches were crafted in such a way as to ensure that the two portrayals were essentially equivalent.
18. On the potential persuasive effects of negative direct mail, see Gerber, Kessler, and Meredith (2011) .
19. We were assisted in writing the candidate biographies, attacks, and responses by an experienced campaign consultant who has worked on numerous legislative races over the years.
Additional details about this survey (including biosketches, the challenger attack and incumbent response, and wording for all items in our background questionnaire) can be found in our online appendix at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/sccraig/apsa13appendix.pdf.
20. The second attack accused the incumbent of being "arrogant" and "out of touch with the people who elected him," i.e., voting to restrict public access to legislative business, doing special favors for campaign supporters, buying a plush Washington townhouse and renting a one-bedroom apartment for "brief" visits home, taking money from Wall Street CEOs to finance his re-election campaigns, and accepting gifts from lobbyists. Budesheim, Houston, and DePaola (1996) ; Matthews and Dietz-Uhler (1999) . It should be noted that baseline support for the candidates does not vary systematically by voter gender. For example, based on the biosketches alone, a slight majority (between 50.6 and 53.5 percent) of both men and women said they would vote for the female candidate as either an incumbent or a challenger; likewise, the baseline favorability score was slightly higher for the female candidate among men and women voters alike.
27. Our research design obviously does not allow us to consider whether women are at a disadvantage when they go negative against a female opponent.
28. As far as we can tell, justifications are rarely used in political campaigns (in part because, like denials and perhaps counterimaging, they are not always a viable option, i.e., some actions cannot be justified in a way that voters will find acceptable). Still, according to political accounts studies, there are occasions when a justification can help to sustain a politician's level of support when s/he has done something, or is portrayed as having done something, inappropriate or unsavory (McGraw 1990; McGraw, Best, and Timpone 1995; Chanley et al., 1994; Smith and Powers 2005) , and our own results indicate that they can blunt the effect of a campaign attack under some circumstances.
29. We also calculated changes in the candidates' relative favorability (incumbent score minus challenger score) from baseline to post-response. For the sample as a whole, all responses except for mudslinging were associated with a gain (p < .10 or better, counterimaging p =.11) in comparative standing for the incumbent; thus, in the end, going negative usually inflicted more damage on the challenger/attacker than it did on the incumbent/target (Craig, Rippere, and
Grayson 2013). Differences between male and female candidates were significant or nearsignificant in three instances that echo the findings reported above: denials and counterimaging worked better for men (p < .001 and .05, respectively), justifications for women (p = .113).
30. While the attack did generate significantly (p < .05) greater backlash in terms of lower challenger favorability among the target's co-partisans, the drop in incumbent favorability was approximately equal for the two groups of identifiers (and significantly larger in both groups than among independents).
31. For all five response types and all three partisan categories, changes in vote share (as well as in incumbent/responder favorability) from t 2 -t 3 are statistically equivalent (p > .10) for male and female candidates. 
Denial
Candidate did nothing wrong:
• pay raises enacted before s/he took office;
• only personal money used to pay for family vacation;
• office complex where district office is located no longer owned by candidate's brother; • overbilling was due to a clerical error and quickly corrected;
• investigation by Attorney General found no evidence of wrongdoing
Counterattack
Opponent is the one deserving of criticism because s/he:
• filed false business tax return;
• accepted illegal campaign contributions;
• steered government contracts to business clients and campaign donors;
• opposed stricter ethics laws for state officials
Counterimaging
Candidate is a (wo)man of character as s/he:
• helped support family after father died;
• put him/herself through college and earned scholarship to graduate school;
• started own business that creates many jobs;
• has served country (active duty/military reserves), community (volunteer work), those less fortunate (established college scholarship fund), and church (charitable activities, missions)
Justification
Candidate's actions were reasonable/warranted:
• pay raises did not apply to anyone currently in office;
• vacation followed official trade meetings, with the party reimbursed for personal expenses; • district office is the same used by predecessor, and rent has not increased since then; • dispute over fee charged for professional services settled amicably; • no personal or close political connections to recipients of state contracts
Mudslinging
Opponent is desperate and has become "relentlessly negative," thereby:
• failing to discuss the issues people really care about;
• ignoring the fact that voters are sick of campaign mudslinging;
• contributing to voter pessimism and low turnout;
• exhibiting weak leadership skills, and a lack of class and integrity 
